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Abstract The development of agriculture and the rural 
economy play a crucial role in China’s socioeconomic system. 
Agriculture insurance has become key in ensuring the growth 
of agriculture and stabilizing farmers’ income when faced with 
natural disasters. The focus of this article is the history of the 
development of Chinese agriculture insurance since the 1980s 
and the trial of a new agriculture insurance launched in 2007, 
the policy details implemented in selected provinces, and the 
operation models. Using results from an investigation and field 
survey conducted since 2007 in Hunan Province, this article 
analyzes the performance and effects of this agriculture insur-
ance trial run from the perspectives of different participating 
stakeholders, and with an emphasis on the program’s four 
principles. The experience and lessons learned are summa-
rized, followed by recommendations on how to ensure the 
smooth operation and sustainable development of this new 
agriculture insurance program.
Keywords agriculture insurance, agriculture insurance 
policy, agriculture insurance trial, China, Hunan Province, 
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1 Introduction
China is among the few countries in the world at risk for a 
large variety of highly destructive natural disasters. Every 
year, China experiences economic losses of up to RMB a few 
hundred billion Yuan from natural disasters, and the portion 
of the losses that the agricultural sector shares is significant. 
Given the fact that China has a rural population of 900 mil-
lion, agriculture is the basic key to ensuring sustainability of 
the national economy. One of the promising means to ensure 
growth of the agricultural economy and the stability of rural 
society when faced with natural disasters is to establish an 
agriculture insurance system. 
We believe that the effective support of government plays 
a critical role in the development of an agriculture insurance 
system. Direct government subsidies to agriculture insurance 
programs are now a popular policy instrument in countries 
where government initiatives are carried out to manage 
disaster risk in the agricultural sector. In the United States, for 
example, government support to agricultural producers in the 
form of premium subsidies started in1980, with legal amend-
ments over time (Gardner and Kramer 1986; Glauber 2004; 
Barnett 2007). According to a systematic review of agricul-
tural insurance practice around the world by Ibarra and Skees 
(2007), the subsidies are organized in a form of bilateral 
system: the government subsidizes the premiums, that is, 
pays a percentage of the total premium, and the administra-
tive costs of the insurance companies are absorbed by govern-
ment funds. These direct subsidies are aimed at establishing a 
viable agriculture disaster insurance market, although some 
researchers have raised concerns about the design of the 
subsidy approaches and their impact on economic efficiency 
and equity (Skees 1999; Goodwin 2001). 
This article first outlines the history of agriculture insur-
ance in China, and uses the profiles of two major insurers 
between the 1980s and 2006 to describe the performance of 
agriculture insurance before the new trial run launched in 
2007. We then review the new trial of agriculture insurance, 
the mechanisms of government support, policy details 
(coverage, premium rates, subsidies, and so on), models of 
operation, and management of the disaster fund. Survey data 
from Hunan Province show the performance of the new trial 
run and summarize the feedback and concerns of various 
stakeholders. An example of good operating practice is dem-
onstrated, followed by a discussion of the four main principles 
of this policy-oriented trial program and recommendations on 
how to improve the operation and sustainability of the current 
development of agriculture insurance in China.
2 The History of Agriculture Insurance 
in China
When the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) was 
founded in 1949, agriculture insurance was one of the first 
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insurance products to be approved in China. China’s trials 
with agriculture insurance began in 1950 with livestock 
and cotton insurance, but it was only available in selected 
counties and districts. Eight years later the People’s Com-
mune system was established and this early pilot program 
was abandoned, although the positive contribution of this 
particular insurance mechanism to the agricultural economy 
was recognized by the central government at the time.
In 1982, China began a second trial with agriculture insur-
ance. This was based on a State Council report submitted by 
the People’s Bank of China (1982), Opinion and Suggestion 
on the Recovery Situation of Domestic Insurance Business 
and Future Development, which suggested the gradual intro-
duction of rural property and livestock insurance, among 
others. The People’s Insurance Company of China operated 
the pilot program, and it got off to a positive start. The receipt 
of annual premiums increased steadily from 1982 to 1992, 
with a sharp increase from 1990 to 1993—the receipt of pre-
miums peaked in 1993, reaching over RMB 829 million Yuan. 
This high level of revenue coincided with the rapid and steady 
development of the agricultural economy—during the same 
period GPD experienced an annual increase of more than 
11 percent for Chinese agriculture, and farmers realized an 
annual increase of more than 9 percent in their net income. By 
1993, the range of agriculture insurance products was exten-
sive and available in most villages and towns in 29 provinces 
among the total 34 provinces in China (including autonomous 
regions and provincial level municipalities). During these 12 
years, the average annual insured loss ratio was 105 percent, 
with a maximum of 136 percent and a minimum of 72 
percent.
However, the profile of this trial changed completely after 
1993, as shown in Figure 1. The annual collected premiums 
dropped sharply in 1994 and 1995, and experienced further 
significant fluctuations from 1996 to 2001. Two key factors 
affected the performance of the trial in agriculture insurance. 
First, starting in 1994, PICC changed from a state-owned 
insurance company with strong policy-related functions to a 
commercial insurance company competing in the market-
driven economy system. Thus, the market for agriculture 
insurance began to shrink because of its high loss ratio from 
the previous 12 years. Second, the annual increases in agri-
culture GDP and farmers’ income fell to less than 5 percent 
in the 1997–2003 period. The insignificant growth experi-
enced by the agricultural economy also affected the further 
development of agriculture insurance.
The Production and Construction Corps of Xinjiang 
founded the Agriculture Insurance Company of Xinjiang 
Corps (now the China United Property Insurance Company) 
in 1986—it was positioned as an agriculture insurance 
company to provide products solely in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region. Figure 2 shows the annual premiums 
collected and indemnities paid from 1987 to 2006. The aver-
age loss ratio was 72 percent, with a maximum of 110 percent 
and a minimum of 56 percent. The company promoted the 
principle of a “low premium rate coupled with a moderate 
insured amount” to achieve a high take-up rate, which proved 
to be effective in practice. In 2002, China United Property 
Insurance Company (China United) was given approval and 
authorization to enter into nationwide business transactions 
and its insurance products range was expanded to include all 
property types.
Figure 1. Profile of agriculture insurance for the People’s 
Insurance Company of China (PICC) from 1982 to 2006
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; 
Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 
2007.
Figure  2. Profile of agriculture insurance for the China 
Unite d Property Insurance Company (China United) from 
1987 to 2006
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; 
Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 
2007.
In addition to the agriculture insurance provided by PICC 
and China United, the Chinese government also explored 
insurance as a means to provide financial protection for 
farmers against natural disasters. In 1987, the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs issued an official notice on the launch of a trial 
in rural cooperative insurance for natural disaster relief. 
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A very limited number of counties/cities were selected to 
participate in the trial program. The program covered crops, 
farmers’ houses, laborers’ compensation, and large livestock. 
The cost of the premium was shared between the government, 
communities, and individual farmers (with the farmers 
responsible for the largest share). Under the policies, each 
household was to pay RMB 10 to 30 Yuan and the insured 
amount was approximately RMB 3000 Yuan. This program 
operated for 12 years, from 1987 to 1999, and it ended 
primarily because of its high loss ratio.
Natural disasters frequently occur in China, and their 
impact on agriculture is significant. From 1982 to 2006, 
insurance companies experienced the heavy burden of insur-
ing crops and livestock against natural hazards, and the peren-
nial high loss ratios forced commercially operated insurance 
companies to reduce their agricultural business. Farmers’ 
incomes in China were still relatively low, and limited 
affordability prevented a growth in the demand for insurance. 
Despite a significant gap between agriculture insurance 
indemnity and agricultural losses caused by natural hazards, 
the development of agriculture insurance was relatively slow 
and, at that stage, it lacked a strong driving force. Thus, agri-
culture insurance from 1982 to 2006 did not meet the needs 
and requirements of China’s developing rural economy.
3 Trial of a New Chinese Model of 
Agriculture Insurance
In 2004, another attempt at agriculture insurance was made at 
the national policy level. The study was assisted by support-
ive policies and the active encouragement of the China Insur-
ance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). The Communist Party 
of China (CPC) Central Committee issued Document No. 1, 
Several Policy-Related Suggestions of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council on Increasing Farmers’ 
Income, in 2004 (2004). The document suggested speeding 
up the establishment of a policy-based agriculture insurance 
system; the selection of a number of products and regions and 
to begin the trial; and the provision of premium subsidies to 
participating farmers in regions where local governments 
could afford such costs.
On 26 June 2006, another document, Several Suggestions 
of the State Council on the Reform and Development of Insur-
ance Industry (Government of the People’s Republic of China 
2006), was issued that recommended the exploration of a new 
model of agriculture insurance, one with multilayered and 
multichannelled subsidies. The subsidies, from both the 
central and local governments, would be provided to partici-
pating farmers (as a premium subsidy) and insurance compa-
nies (as an administrative cost subsidy). The document also 
recommended exploring the establishment of an agriculture 
reinsurance system, via fiscal support from both the central 
and local governments. This document was considered to be 
a milestone in the history of Chinese agriculture insurance, 
because it provided a policy base for governmental financial 
support.
In 2007, the CPC Central Committee approved RMB one 
billion Yuan toward an agriculture insurance subsidy fund, 
and six provinces (Hunan, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Sichuan, and Jiangsu) were chosen to participate in the new 
agriculture insurance trial. From the beginning this new trial 
showed vitality and rapid growth. In 2007, the total premiums 
collected from agriculture insurance were approximately 
RMB 5.2 billion Yuan, an increase of 612.5 percent from 
2006, accounting for 2.49 percent of all property premium 
types. Total agriculture indemnity was approximately RMB 
2.7 billion Yuan, 2.83 percent of all indemnity payouts in 
property business. The total insured amount was over RMB 
172 billion Yuan (Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of 
China’s Insurance 2002–2010). In 2008, the agriculture insur-
ance industry continued to grow rapidly and expanded into 
17 provinces and regions. More than 0.5 billion Mui of crops 
and 90 million farming families participated in the program. 
The total of all premiums collected was in excess of RMB 
11 billion Yuan, and total indemnity exceeded RMB 7 billion 
Yuan. The total insured amount reached RMB 240 billion 
Yuan (Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insur-
ance 2002–2010). In 2009, the total of all premiums collected 
reached RMB 13.4 billion Yuan, and total indemnity was 
RMB 9.5 billion Yuan. The total insured amount in 2009 was 
RMB 381 billion Yuan (Editorial Committee of Yearbooks 
of China’s Insurance 2002–2010). Figures 3 and 4 show the 
premiums collected and the indemnity payouts for PICC 
and China United after the launch of the new program. The 
numbers from 2001 to 2006 are also plotted in Figures 3 and 
4 to enable comparisons. The industry has experienced rapid 
growth since the implementation of the new program in 2007. 
By 2010, the new agriculture insurance program had been 
introduced in 25 provinces and autonomous regions. Figure 5 
shows the areas that were covered by the program and 
received central government subsidies from 2007 to 2010.
Figure 3. Profile of agriculture insurance for the People’s 
Insurance Company of China (PICC) from 2001 to 2009
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; 
Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 
2007.
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Some types of livestock were also covered under the new 
agriculture insurance program. Insurance for pig breeding 
was remarkably successful. In 2007, approximately 14.7 
million breeding-pigs were insured under the program. 
By 2008, that number had increased to 47.6 million, and 
to 52.7 million in 2009, that is more than 75 percent of all 
breeding-pigs nationwide were insured.
The new round of insurance trials has completely revived 
a previously depressed and unstable agriculture insurance 
industry. With the expansion of agriculture insurance, many 
other kinds of insurance and financial products have become 
available in rural China, including endowment insurance 
for farmers involved in land ownership transfers, new rural 
cooperative medical insurance, and insurance for rural micro-
credit. Thus, a new multidirectional rural insurance system 
has been gradually established.
3.1 New Models of Agriculture Insurance with Fiscal 
Support
The first six provinces in the new agriculture insurance 
program trial were Hunan, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Sichuan, and Jiangsu. PICC, China United, and Jilin Anhua 
Agriculture Insurance Company were selected to become 
the key participating companies. This new fiscally supported 
agriculture insurance operated on three general terms:
The program covered seven natural disasters: rainstorms, 
floods, waterlogging, windstorms, hail, ice storms, and 
droughts. Certain diseases in crops and livestock were 
also covered.
Premium rates varied from 3 percent to 10 percent of 
insured amount, according to region, crop, and peril.
Low premiums were coupled with moderate insured 
amounts. Crop insurance only covered the basic cost of 
crops, including costs of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
irrigation, machinery, and mulching film. Labor costs 
were excluded.
Though the newly launched program sends exciting 
signals to the market, there are some concerns about the 
Figure 4. Profile of agriculture insurance for the China 
Unite d Property Insurance Company (China United) from 
2001 to 2009
Source: Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Insurance 2002–2010; 
Editorial Committee of Yearbooks of China’s Economy 1991–2001; Guo et al. 
2007.
Figure 5. Chinese provinces and autonomous regions selected for the trial of the new agriculture insurance program and 
receiving central government subsidies from 2007 to 2010
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premium rate system. In the trial program, premium rates are 
determined by provincial government and updated on an 
annual basis. However, there is no satisfactory quantitative 
risk assessment meeting actuarial standards, but only an 
estimation of the loss-cost ratio based on past experiences. 
This brings high uncertainty into the system as China does not 
have crop insurance business records long enough to make a 
good estimation, particularly for potential catastrophic years. 
Additionally, those estimated rates are often not actually 
applied as negotiations are quite common in the rating 
process because of the involvement of government funding. 
The subsidies from both the central and provincial govern-
ments usually exceeded 50 percent of the premium amount. 
The subsidies from municipal and county governments varied 
region-to-region, but were usually between 10 percent and 30 
percent. Policyholders (farmers) had to pay the remainder of 
the premium.
At the government level, independent fiscal accounts were 
created and independently managed. Provincial governments 
set aside capital sourced from annual agriculture insurance 
surpluses to be used as emergency reserves. When a large-
scale disaster occurs and the indemnity payouts reach a 
certain threshold, the provincial governments can access the 
disaster funds to help insurers cover the losses.
Table 1 provides a summary of the crop insurance prod-
ucts, including the extent of the coverage, premium rates and 
subsidies, participating companies, fund management, and an 
overview of the operation in 2007 in the selected provinces. 
These provinces also explored different methods to promote 
this insurance program. Sichuan Province, for example, 
considered participation in the agriculture insurance to be a 
key precondition for the participation in other policy-oriented 
preferential programs (for example, farmers’ microcredit 
program), and there were additional benefits (by way of 
financial support and loans) for agriculture insurance 
program participants.
3.2 Model of Operation
Various levels of government have different roles in the mode l 
of operation. The involvement of the central government 
Table 1. Details of the crop insurance policies for the six provinces selected for the 2007 agriculture insurance trial
Hunan Jilin Inner Mongolia Xinjiang Sichuan Jiangsu
Coverage Paddy rice, cotton, 
rapeseed
Corn, paddy rice, 
soybean, peanut, 
sunflower seed
Corn, wheat, soybean Cotton, corn, paddy 
rice, wheat, soybean, 
rapeseed, peanut
Paddy rice, corn Paddy rice, wheat, 
cotton, rapeseed, corn
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United
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PICC, China United, 
and Groupama
PICC, China Pacific 










insured amount: 7.7 
billion Yuan; 49.27% 
of crops insured; 
> 2 million families 
involved; insured 
amount for livestock: 
1.4 billion Yuan
40.62% of crops 
(corn, wheat, 
soybean) covered; 
1.2 million families 
involved
Premiums collected: 
757 million Yuan 
(ranked No. 1 in 
China);
88% of cotton 
covered; 58.9% of 
breeding pigs covered
Premiums collected: 
740 million Yuan; 
indemnity payouts: 
197 million Yuan;
15.46 million live 
pigs and 4.91 million 
breeding pigs insured 
(ranked No.1 in 
China)
Premiums collected: 
449 million Yuan; 
indemnity payouts: 
369 million Yuan; 
insured amount: 10.3 
billion Yuan; 88.54% 
of paddy rice insured
* Officially specified districts for water detention and diversion are excluded.
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illustrates the strong national policy guidance, and its subsi-
dies encourage the enrollment of all stakeholders. Because 
this trial run should take into full consideration regional 
economic development and agricultural production, the role 
of provincial governments is to work with insurers at the pro-
vincial level to formulate the policy details and associated 
regulations. The involvement of local governments mainly 
focuses on the promotion of the trial program and provides 
necessary technical assistance to local insurers. A typical 
operation model is depicted in Figure 6. The solid arrows 
denote payment, and the dashed arrows denote the submis-
sion of a budget and the transaction report. The government 
subsidy operation can be summarized in five steps:
Step (1): Farmers pay the partial premium to the county-
level insurers, forming a valid policy. In the case of 
Hunan, farmers pay about 30 percent of the total premium 
to insurers.
Step (2): The county-level insurers send the valid policies 
to the county-level local government, usually the Bureau 
of Finance, who then pays the required subsidies.
Step (3): At the end of the fiscal year, the provincial 
government has the required subsidy funds available 
(based on the aggregated data of valid polices for the 
year). Once the provincial government subsidy fund is in 
place, the central government pays the required subsidies 
to the provincial government. In the case of Hunan, the 
central government pays 35 percent of the total premiums 
to the provincial government.
Step (4): The provincial government pays the subsidies 
from both the central and provincial governments to the 
provincial-level insurers. In Hunan, for example, 60 
percent (35 percent + 25 percent) of the total premiums is 
paid to the provincial-level insurers.
Step (5): The provincial-level insurers reserve 25 percent 
of the total premiums as a disaster fund for future large 
losses, and pay the remainder of the subsidies to the 
county-level insurers. In Hunan, 35 percent of the total 
premiums are paid by the provincial-level insurers to the 
county-level insurers.
3.3 Disaster Fund
The disaster fund system was established to hold the annual 
surpluses of the agriculture insurance industry. For example, 
approximately 70 percent of the surplus from paddy rice 
insurance and RMB 8 Yuan per breeding-pig were placed into 
the fund. Different provinces have slightly different regula-
tions regarding the use and management of their disaster 
funds. In general, insurers are suggested to reserve their 
surplus from agriculture insurance as a disaster fund for 
future catastrophic losses. Insurers are also encouraged by 
government to cultivate rural insurance markets by using the 
opportunity of this agriculture insurance trial to explore other 
profitable rural insurance business.
In addition to the insurers’ funds, the government also 
helps to promote the establishment of disaster funds via 
financial support. In Jiangsu Province, a disaster fund has 
been established for each municipality. The fund consists 
of three parts. The first represents 10 percent of the total 
premiums collected by county-level insurers. The second is a 
matching fund from municipalities, which usually accounts 
for 50 percent of the total fund returned by county-level insur-
ers. Finally, once the funds from both a county and municipal-
ity have been received, the provincial government matches all 
the previous contributions to 100 percent. The disaster fund 
is managed by the Bureau of Finance in each municipality 
under an independent account.
When a large-scale disaster occurs, the fund is applied by 
using the premiums collected in the present year first; then the 
reserved funds from the agriculture insurance companies; and 
finally, the government-supported disaster fund is accessed.
3.4 Other Regional Trials in Agriculture Insurance
While specific operational details may vary among the six 
trial provinces, in general they follow the principles and 
operation model discussed above. In 2007, when the trial was 
first introduced to these provinces, a number of other prov-
inces and autonomous regions also began their own regional 
trials in agriculture insurance. Shi et al. (2008) have com-
mented on the two unique models implemented in Beijing 
and Zhejiang Province. In Beijing, the government provides 
a 50 percent premium subsidy to the farmers and a 50 percent 
operating cost subsidy to insurers; 0.1 percent of any added 
value of agriculture from the previous year are withheld and 
placed into the agricultural disaster risk reserve fund. When 
the insured loss ratio reaches 160 percent, the government 
compensates the insurance companies from the disaster risk 
reserve fund. Zhejiang Province employs a totally different 
model, in which the government plays an important role in 
loss-sharing. The 12 participating insurance companies 
are members of the Agricultural Policy Insurance Union of 
Zhejiang Province. The loss-sharing mechanism is defined 
and operated on the basis of the level of insured loss (Shi 
et al. 2008). The aim of this policy-based program is to share 
the risk among the main stakeholders, that is the farmers, 
governments, and insurers.
Figure 6. Schematic drawing of an operation model for an 
agriculture insurance trial
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4 Field Survey and Investigation 
Findings
We have been conducting field investigations and surveys in 
Hunan Province since 2007 to study the trial of policy-based 
agriculture insurance. Workshops and surveys have been 
conducted among the major stakeholders, including:
Government officials at provincial, municipal, county, 
and village levels who supervise, manage, or assist 
the insurance programs. They include officials from 
the Bureaus of Finance, Civil Affairs, and Insurance 
Regulations.
Insurance companies at provincial, municipal, and county 
branches who operate the program. They include manag-
ers and professionals from both PICC and China United.
Farmers randomly interviewed in different counties, 
who may or may not be participating in the insurance 
program.
Other government officials and professionals who provide 
technical support to the program. They are, for example, 
from the Bureau of Agriculture and the Meteorological 
Bureau.
As shown in Figure 7, only 15.1 percent of the farmers 
interviewed in 2007 were aware that a new agriculture insur-
ance program was available. This percentage continued to 
increase and reached 30.5 percent in 2008, 64.9 percent 
in 2009, and 81.7 percent in 2010. Of the 566 farmers 
interviewed in 2009 who were aware of the new agriculture 
insurance program, 67 percent learned of its introduction 
from village officials or official documents (Figure 8a). Thus, 
the introduction and promotion of insurance programs by 
local governments, especially village officials, and its fiscal 
subsidies, have played an important role with regard to the 
farmers’ increased awareness of the availability of agriculture 
insurance.
The field survey and investigation resulted in an improved 
understanding of how well the trial progressed, and it created 
the opportunity to receive the comments and suggestions of 
the various stakeholders involved in the insurance programs. 
The investigation in Hunan showed that although the pilot 
work has achieved good results, a number of problems 
remain.
Despite annual increases in the percentage of farmers 
that were aware of the available insurance programs (see 
Figure 7), very few farmers received actual program advice 
from insurance companies (see Figure 8a)—their usual 
channels of information were from government officials and 
village heads. A key disadvantage in not receiving informa-
tion from insurance professionals is that the farmers may not 
be aware of many of the policy details. As Figure 8b shows, 
of the farmers who were aware that insurance was available, 
57.8 percent were not aware of the details of the agriculture 
insurance policies, and only 14.1 percent felt familiar with the 
policy details.
4.1 Feedback and Concerns of Participating Insurance 
Companies
The companies participating in the insurance programs 
believe that the new agriculture insurance trials can help them 
extend their businesses to include a potentially huge market, 
that is the rural areas where the majority of the Chinese 
population live. The financial support (subsidies) offered in 
the trial encourages insurers to operate in the area of agricul-
ture insurance. However, the participating companies also 
face difficulties: 
(1) High operating costs: The participating insurance 
companies, especially county branches, have experienced 
relatively high operating costs in carrying out their many 
duties, from introducing the program into villages, to premiu m 
collection and post-disaster claim settlement. Three factors 
have been identified as causing the high operating costs:
Many villages are isolated and dispersed, resulting in high 
transportation costs to access them.
Many rural areas in China lack other relevant insurance 
products for farmers. Therefore, the effort and operating 
costs required solely for agriculture insurance are not 
considered efficient.
Nearly all counties in China now have insurance offices. 
However, very few offices have been opened in the 
villages or towns.
(2) Difficulty in claim adjustments: Insurance companies 
sometimes fail to make an insurance payout on time because 
they find it difficult to accurately adjust the claim within a 
limited time frame. This is unsatisfactory to the policyholders 
who have experienced a loss. Three reasons account for this 
delay:
Farmers usually enter into a group policy with other farm-
ers from the same village or town. The group policy shows 
only an aggregate number of crops insured. During the 
Figure 7. Percentage of interviewed farmers in Hunan Prov-
ince who were aware of the availability of the new agriculture 
insurance program (the numbers in brackets are the sample 
sizes of the surveys)
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process of claim settlement, the insurance companies face 
great difficulty identifying the property of individuals.
A reliable database does not exist with regard to the crops 
of individuals, which increases the difficulty of loss 
adjustment.
The insurance companies do not have a sufficient number 
of professionals to process the large number of small 
claims.
(3) Gap between government control and market-operated 
businesses: One of the basic principles of the agriculture 
insurance trial is that of “market operation.” However, the 
insurance companies usually find it impossible to operate a 
purely market-based program. It is difficult, for example, for 
insurers to operate following the low premium rate deter-
mined by the government—the insurers are only allowed to 
adjust the premium rate slightly, even under the principle of 
“market operation.” The agriculture insurance program has 
become a responsibility assigned by government, and the 
government does not appear to attach sufficient importance to 
the opinions and comments of the insurers. In the original 
design of this program, the role of government was to 
promote and guide the program via fiscal support. However, 
the “guiding” role of government has gradually become a 
“leading” role, and the government has exerted control in 
many aspects of the program’s business operation. Therefore, 
the insurers find it difficult to assert their roles in the 
program.
(4) Lack of confidence in the sustainability of the program: 
As the insurers’ roles in the design of the trial program (for 
example, premium rates, coverage, and subsidies) are limited, 
they are not confident of their ability to cover losses from a 
large-scale disaster, such as in the case of the 1998 flood that 
damaged 22.3 million hectares of crops (Ministry of Water 
Resources of the People’s Republic of China 1999). This is 
despite the fact that the participating insurance companies are 
aware that the current agriculture program with fiscal support 
can be profitable in the short term.
4.2 Feedback and Concerns of Farmers
The main incentive for farmers to participate in the program 
is to obtain sufficient compensation in a disaster to enable 
them to resume their agricultural production. It is for this 
reason that farmers pay close attention to the premium rate, 
the insured amount, and coverage. The current premium is 
generally considered to be reasonable and acceptable by 
farmers, and the current coverage is sufficient for most of the 
risks farmers face. It is the insured amount that the farmers 
are unhappy about.
(1) Low insured amount: The insured amount is consid-
ered to be low. The original design of the agriculture insur-
ance was to insure the basic cost of production. For example, 
the insured amount for paddy rice in Hunan is RMB 180 Yuan 
per Mu for the seedling period and RMB 280 Yuan per Mu for 
harvest time (2010 policy). However, according to our field 
survey, as shown in Table 2, the basic costs, for example, for 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and machinery, can be 
much higher than the insured amount, even with labor costs 
excluded, especially for late season rice. The low insured 
amount discourages farmers from purchasing insurance 
because the indemnity amount is considered too low when 
compared with their potential loss of income, usually RMB 
750 Yuan per Mu (2010 survey data). This also explains why 
the insurance policies with regard to breeding-pigs and cows 
are more attractive to farmers. The insured amount of RMB 
1000 Yuan per breeding-pig and RMB 4000 Yuan per cow 
(2010 policy) are more in line with the economic value of pigs 
and cows.
(2) Priority of disaster reduction: Many farmers have 
commented that the government should first help them to 
increase their capabilities against natural disasters, especially 
with regard to improvements in irrigation facilities and 
infrastructure. Based on our survey results conducted in 
Hunan, more than 58 percent of the farmers believe that the 
top priority of the government in disaster reduction and miti-
gation should be “to increase investment to build up a better 
Figure 8. Channels through which farmers in Hunan Province are informed about the availability of the new agriculture 
insurance program (a) and the degree of familiarity with policy details (b)
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capacity against disasters,” with only 24 percent believing 
that it should be “to provide a subsidy for agriculture 
insurance.”
(3) Lack of sufficient trust in insurers: Some farmers have 
little trust in insurance companies, and their main concern is 
that they may not receive a payout after a disaster. This belief 
is based largely on previous negative settlement experiences 
with insurance companies, particularly during the early 1990s 
when the insurance market in rural areas grew rapidly 
yet insurance regulations and laws were not enacted or 
enforced.
4.3 Feedback and Concerns of Local Governments 
(1) Urgent need of regulations and laws: The associated 
regulations and laws, with regard to the current agriculture 
insurance and fiscal support, have not been explicitly covered 
by the Insurance Law (Government of the People’s Republic 
of China 2009). However, agriculture insurance, as an impor-
tant component of the institutional design to develop and 
protect agriculture, relies heavily on the enforcement of the 
associated regulations and laws. A law to standardize and 
protect the activities of the stakeholders in the agriculture 
insurance business is urgently required.
(2) Role of local governments: Most county-level govern-
ments find it difficult to pay the subsidy from their limited 
fiscal budgets. They should only be required to assist local 
insurance companies to promote agriculture insurance and to 
provide technical support and policy guidance.
(3) Need of risk-sharing structure: A multilayered risk-
sharing structure should be established. The current disaster 
fund is still in its early stages and cannot provide sufficient 
financial protection for potential large-scale disasters. 
The participation of reinsurance companies, particularly 
international reinsurers, is critical. 
4.4 An Example of Good Operating Practice 
Despite the various difficulties and challenges faced by stake-
holders, Changde Municipality in northern Hunan Province 
has achieved success in its agriculture insurance business, 
with a high take-up rate and a high percentage of voluntary 
participation initiated by farmers (50 percent or higher in 
many towns in 2010). Changde’s success was aided by 
the implementation of innovative policies at the local level. 
Figure 9 shows the new operation model for Changde, in 
which most towns have appointed task officials to administer 
agriculture insurance. Generally, the task officials have had 
previous experience in financial management or civil affairs 
management. The task officer for each township becomes a 
facilitator to ensure good communication between insurers 
and local communities. In this operation model, an insurance 
assistant is assigned for each village, with the candidate gen-
erally being an accountant or village clerk, and experienced 
in financial management.
Premium Collection: It is the role of the insurance assis-
tants and task officers to introduce and promote agriculture 
insurance within local communities. Farmers pay the premi-
ums directly to the insurance assistants, and they then forward 
the collected premiums and the policies for the entire village 
to the task officer. Once the premiums and policies for all the 
villages within the township have been received, the task 
officer forwards the premiums and policies to the county 
branch insurer and reports to the county government.
Loss Adjustment: After a disaster, the village insurance 
assistants first assess any losses by the farmers and report 
this to the task officers. The task officers then return to each 
village to review and double-check the losses. After receiving 
loss reports from the task officers, the insurers at the county 
branch send in professional assessors to conduct a spot-check 
on the reported losses.
In the Changde model the county-level government, 
instead of providing a 10 percent premium subsidy, has 
assigned officers in every township to ensure the effective 
operation of the program. Therefore, the presence of task 
officers has eased the significant burden of operating costs of 
insurance companies, and county-level government can 
now focus on improving service quality and developing other 
rural insurance products. For those farmers who have never 
had insurance or do not trust insurance companies, this new 
model provides alternatives through which they can buy 
insurance directly from the insurance assistants—people they 
know well from their own communities. As the trust between 
insurers and farmers is established and more insurance 
branches are introduced in the townships, government 
participation can be gradually withdrawn and their focus can 
shift to the management of the reserve fund. The Changde 
model of policy implementation solves many issues and it 
shows a new way of government support, other than just 
financial support, for policy-based insurance. However, the 
Table 2. Comparison between basic cost of paddy rice in Hunan Province (data from 2010 field survey) and current insured 
amount (data from 2010 insurance policy)
Basic Costs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and facilities rental, with labor 
cost excluded, 2010 survey data)
RMB Yuan
Insured Amount in 2010 Policy
RMB Yuan 
Mean Standard Deviation 25 Percentile 75 Percentile Seedling Period Tiller Period Ripe Period
Early Season Rice 292 101 228 340 180 240 280
Late Season Rice 348  98 289 400 180 240 280
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Changde model also faces some challenging questions. 
Should the assigned task officers and insurance assistants be 
paid? If so, by whom, and through whose accounts? Without 
clear regulations or laws to standardize task officers and 
insurance assistants’ responsibilities and to protect their 
benefits, the new operation model and its good operating 
practices will not be sustainable.
5 The Four Principles of the Agriculture 
Insurance Trial
It is important to recognize the four basic principles used 
in the agriculture insurance trial: guided by government; 
market-oriented operation; voluntary participation; and 
propelled under joint forces. The first principle, “guided by 
government,” determines the role of government. The main 
role of government in the trial is to provide subsidies to the 
farmers who want to purchase agriculture insurance, thereby 
creating affordable policies and assisting market growth. 
The government both initiated and promoted the insurance 
program, and it encouraged the farmers and insurance compa-
nies to participate. The government subsidies have helped to 
create a new market in rural China. However, the first prin-
ciple also clearly implies that government responsibility with 
regard to this program is limited, and that the government 
does not share responsibility for any of the insured losses 
with the participating insurance companies, even when those 
losses are significant.
This implication is also emphasized in the second principle 
of “market-oriented operation.” The operation of this 
program relies on commercial insurance companies, and the 
participating insurance companies should accept all the 
associated risks. Insurers need to rely on market mechanisms 
to develop their agriculture insurance businesses and should 
treat their businesses the same as any other commercial insur-
ance business, from policy sales to the settling of claims. 
Moreover, the insurers should work with other industry part-
ners and take advantage of market capital to diversify and 
transfer their risks. The first two principles indicate that the 
role of the government should not be overemphasized in the 
new agriculture insurance trial. Although the initial support 
from the government by way of promotion and financial 
support has been important, the program is designed to enable 
the insurance industry to lead the way.
The third principle, “voluntary participation,” determines 
that program involvement is voluntary, especially with regard 
to the farmers. Farmers themselves decide whether to 
purchase agriculture insurance for their crops and livestock 
based on their understanding of the actual risk and the afford-
ability of the policies. While the government subsidies may 
encourage farmers to participate during the initial stages, 
whether the products meet the farmers’ true needs and 
whether farmers are satisfied with the insurers’ services 
will directly determine the sustainability and vitality of the 
program in the long term.
The fourth principle, “propelled under joint forces,” indi-
cates that multiple stakeholders are involved in the program, 
based on the special characteristics of agriculture insurance. 
The government provides both subsidies and policy guidance, 
and central, provincial and city/county governments are 
all involved. Other government institutions, such as the 
Meteorological, Agriculture, and Water Resources Bureaus, 
also participate to provide technical support, especially with 
regard to disaster mitigation and loss adjustment.
Figure 9. Operation model for Changde in northern Hunan Province
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6 Discussion and Recommendations
6.1 Further Development of Government Support
China is a nation with a large agricultural base and a domi-
nantly rural population—it is also a country that experiences 
many natural disasters and numerous losses in agricultural 
production. The impact of natural disasters on agricultural 
production in China has a strong correlation with the poverty 
issues of rural households. Moreover, agricultural production 
is one of the least profitable industries in China. In 1978 the 
wheat price, for example, was only slightly higher than RMB 
0.1 Yuan per 500 grams, while the average monthly salary of 
a university graduate was approximately RMB 40 Yuan. By 
2008, the price for wheat was RMB 0.7 Yuan per 500 grams, 
and the average monthly salary of a university graduate had 
increased to more than RMB 1000 Yuan. Increase in the price 
of wheat has been too slow when compared with that of sala-
ries. With this in mind, China’s agricultural production—
characterized by inadequate technology levels, high disaster 
risk, and low profit—requires greater government guidance 
and support to ensure the success of the program. The inter-
national experience with agriculture insurance also indicates 
that most good operating practices and success stories can be 
linked to the effective support from both the government and 
the industry.
It is possible to diversify the means of government support 
to agriculture insurance. As such, government support in 
China should focus on the following aspects.
(1) Fiscal subsidies: The high insured loss ratio and high 
premium rates have always discouraged both insurance com-
panies and farmers from converting the agriculture insurance 
industry into a completely commercial market. Government 
financial participation in agriculture insurance is classified as 
the Green Box support under the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Agriculture (WTO 1995). The main question 
with regard to fiscal subsidies in China is how to increase and 
strengthen government subsidies and to allocate the funding 
effectively and efficiently.
The agriculture insurance subsidies should be included in 
the central government’s fiscal budget, and a mechanism of 
enduring effect should be established to support the program. 
Both the central and provincial governments share the cost of 
the subsidies. The subsidies from county government should 
not be mandatory, and county government should focus on 
providing technical support and policy guidance to ensure the 
smooth operation of the agriculture insurance in the local 
communities. Moreover, the subsidies from government 
should reflect the principle of policy guidance. The priority of 
subsidies should be given to key crops that are directly linked 
to the national strategy of food security. Based on actual 
needs, subsidies for different stakeholders should be consid-
ered. First, premium subsidies for the participating farmers 
should be considered, and these subsidies could then motivate 
farmers to purchase agriculture insurance and increase the 
geographic coverage of the policy up-take. Second, attention 
should be turned to a subsidy for the operating costs of 
participating insurance companies. This subsidy would 
encourage insurers to expand their business to include more 
rural areas. Third, an incentive subsidy should be considered 
to encourage risk transference to international market capital 
via reinsurance.
(2) Tax incentives: International experience shows that tax 
incentives are widely used in agriculture insurance. Currently, 
only business taxes with regard to agriculture insurance 
services are exempt under the Detailed Rule for the Imple-
mentation of the Provisional Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on Business Tax (Ministry of Finance 
1993)—there are no other tax incentives for agriculture insur-
ance. This situation is not helping with the growth of the 
agriculture insurance industry. Therefore, tax reductions 
or exemptions on income tax and other taxes incurred by 
participating insurance companies should be considered, even 
if just for a short period to aid the development of the agricul-
ture insurance market. Any expenses incurred in purchasing 
agriculture insurance should be exempt from income tax.
(3) Other financial support: Various financial support 
mechanisms should be considered to provide financial pro-
tection for both participating farmers and insurers. Agricul-
ture credit should be given to farmers who have purchased 
agriculture insurance. A relevant policy should be created 
to allow participating insurers to apply for interest-free or 
low-interest loans when they experience significant losses in 
agriculture insurance, which can result in serious problems 
for their company’s operation. Other financial support may 
include establishing a national disaster risk fund for agricul-
ture insurance or developing disaster securities. These finan-
cial support methods can significantly reduce the devastating 
impact of large-scale disasters on this emerging agriculture 
insurance system.
(4) Relaxing the restrictions on the reach of the insurance 
industry: Current restrictions on the reach of the insurance 
industry should be relaxed for participating insurance compa-
nies, and other insurance products specific to farmers (for 
example, farmers’ short-term health insurance and farmers’ 
accident injury insurance) should be allowed and encouraged. 
In this way, the costs for insurers to cultivate the rural insur-
ance market and business expenses can be addressed with 
greater efficiency.
6.2 Recommendations to Improve the Operation Model
Three major issues should be considered with regard to the 
operation model for the trial agriculture insurance program. 
First, the willingness of insurers and farmers to participate 
largely depends on government subsidies, raising the key 
questions of how to design an appropriate subsidy model and 
subsidy levels. Second, the information asymmetry between 
insurers and farmers can generate issues of adverse selection 
and various moral issues. Therefore, the strengthening of 
supervision and management in the business operation is 
critical. Finally, the commercial insurance market is still 
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immature in China and insurance companies are finding it 
difficult to determine reasonable and realistic coverage and 
premium rates based on the consideration of regional differ-
ences in disaster risks, agriculture production, and economic 
development. The following recommendations are proposed 
to improve the operation model.
(1) For crops that are of vital importance to national food 
security (for example, wheat, paddy rice, and corn), the pre-
miums to be paid by the farmers should be further reduced. 
Alternative payment methods should also be made available 
to farmers. For example, the central and provincial govern-
ments could allocate supportive counterpart funds for agricul-
ture insurance, and the funds would then be used to pay 
100 percent of the premiums to insurers. Farmers would then 
repay the funds in cash or with crops under the circumstance 
of an “average” harvest/yield being achieved.
(2) Participating insurance companies should emphasize 
the model of “independent account set-up and management.” 
The premium income from the agriculture insurance can only 
be used for claim payouts and operating costs, and any 
surplus should be held in reserve in the disaster fund.
(3) The participation of farmers could be secured with 
either a group policy or an individual policy. Whatever the 
situation, a copy of the insurance policy must be given to 
every insured individual. The relevant information needs to 
be discussed and disclosed in the participating villages to pro-
mote transparency in the operation of agriculture insurance.
(4) The associated government and professional institu-
tions should provide support with agriculture risk assessments 
and insurance regionalization, as these tasks ultimately 
depend on the large amounts of data collected over the years. 
However, the final decision with regard to premium rates and 
coverage should remain with the insurers and be adjusted 
by the market. For example, in 2009 a number of industries 
(forestry, pigs, and hybrid rice) were selected in certain 
provinces to participate in a trial of an entirely market-based 
operation.
6.3 The Need to Further Enhance Capabilities against 
Agricultural Disasters
Agricultural infrastructure within most areas in rural China is 
still very vulnerable to natural disasters, especially to drought 
and waterlogging. Both the government and the insurance 
industry cannot afford to cover losses arising from large-
scale, or even small-scale, disasters every 3–5 years. There-
fore, the prerequisite to establishing a sustainable agriculture 
insurance system is that the agricultural infrastructure must 
have the basic capability to deal with, at the very least, a once 
every 10-year natural disaster. Otherwise, the disaster fund 
will not be able to build to the appropriate level to cope with 
large-scale disasters in the future. Therefore, local govern-
ments should continue to strengthen their investments to fur-
ther build an agricultural infrastructure to alleviate the impact 
of any disaster, and to make full use of agriculture insurance 
for the purpose of risk transference.
7 Conclusion
In the past 60 years, the agriculture insurance of China expe-
rienced several distinct stages of development. The new trial 
run of agriculture insurance launched in 2007 has shown its 
vitality and experienced rapid growth of business. This is in 
contrast to the agriculture insurance profiles in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s when the agriculture insurance business con-
tinued to shrink because of its high loss ratio. This dramatic 
change is mainly due to the government policy initiative and 
subsidies in support of the new agriculture insurance trial. 
However, many issues remain in the current practice. First, 
the rapidly growing business of agriculture insurance urgentl y 
requires a law to standardize and to protect the activities of 
the stakeholders that are not explicitly covered by the current 
Insurance Law. Second, the role of government in the policy-
oriented trial should be clearly defined, and any government 
involvement should always take into full consideration the 
potential conflict with market-oriented operations and mech-
anisms. Third, although the survey data show that more and 
more farmers are aware of the trial program and have started 
to participate, most insurers have not established their busi-
ness network to reach most villages in China. Innovative 
models of operation that aim to resolve the difficulties of both 
farmers and local insurers are necessary. 
It is believed that the government subsidy model in the 
current trial run does promote the emergence of a vigorous 
agriculture insurance market in China. More and more 
farmers are receiving insurance coverage with the expansion 
of the trial program. Nevertheless, there are several issues that 
require careful analysis from the economic perspective. For 
instance, do the heavy subsidies induce exacerbated moral 
hazard issues as happened in the United States? Also, with the 
subsidies from tax revenue, all taxpayers share the cost of 
crop insurance, and it has not been well justified from the 
viewpoint of efficiency and equity. Finally, there are plenty of 
approaches for the government to provide aid to farmers. 
Whether the subsidies have created the right incentives, made 
farmers better off, or even increased social welfare, remains a 
question for further study. 
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